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ABSTRACT In this article, downlink secure transmission in simultaneous information and power trans-
fer (SWIPT) system enabled with massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) is studied. A base
station (BS) with a large number of antennas transmits energy and information signals to its intended users,
but these signals are also received by an active eavesdropper. The users and eavesdropper employ a power
splitting technique to simultaneously decode information and harvest energy. Massive MIMO helps the BS
to focus energy to the users and prevent information leakage to the eavesdropper. The harvested energy by
each user is employed for decoding information and transmitting uplink pilot signals for channel estimation.
It is assumed that the active eavesdropper also harvests energy in the downlink and then contributes
during the uplink training phase. Achievable secrecy rate is considered as the performance criterion and a
closed-form lower bound for it is derived. To provide secure transmission, the achievable secrecy rate is then
maximized through an optimization problem with constraints on the minimum harvested energy by the user
and the maximum harvested energy by the eavesdropper. Numerical results show the effectiveness of using
massive MIMO in providing physical layer security in SWIPT systems and also show that our closed-form
expressions for the secrecy rate are accurate.
INDEX TERMS Active eavesdropper, energy harvesting (EH), massive MIMO, non-linear energy har-
vesting (EH), physical layer security, power splitting (PS), simultaneous wireless information and power
transfer (SWIPT).
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, employing energy harvesting techniques has been
regarded as a promising approach to prolong the lifetime of
wireless low power networks. These techniques are useful
in many applications including wireless communications in
extreme environments, sensor networks and medical Internet
of Things (m-IoT) applications [1]–[3]. Traditional renew-
able energy sources such as solar andwind energy areweather
dependent and not available everywhere and anytime. Thus,
energy harvesting from ambient radio frequency (RF) signals
has recently drawn a significant research interest due to many
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Jiayi Zhang .
practical advantages, such as wide operating range, being pre-
dictable, low production cost, small receiver form factor, and
efficient energymulticasting thanks to the broadcast nature of
electromagnetic (EM) waves [1]–[6]. The wide coverage of
cellular communication networks, and the need for powering
a massive number of low-power IoT devices in the next
generations of wireless networks provide an opportunity for
RF-based power transfer techniques to be considered as a
prominent and scalable solution. The conventional role of RF
signals as information carrier has attracted attention to simul-
taneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT)
as an emerging technology to solve the energy supply prob-
lem in power-constrained networks. In SWIPT systems, two
architectures of separated and hybrid receivers have been
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proposed for information decoding and energy harvesting.
In the separated architecture, the information and energy
receivers operate separately [7]–[9], whereas in the hybrid
architecture a common receiver is used for both harvesting
energy and information decoding. In this architecture, the
signal which is used for decoding the information cannot
be reused for harvesting the energy due to hardware limi-
tations [10]. Thus, the received signal has to be split into
two parts, one for information decoding and another for
energy harvesting. Time switching and power splitting are
two common hybrid receiver architectures in the literature
[11]–[14]. On the other hand, in SWIPT systems, the RF
energy harvesting in the receiver is generally modeled by two
linear and non-linear models which the non-linear model is
more practical [4], [15]–[21]. Since RF signals significantly
attenuate over distance, improving energy transfer efficiency
is a great challenge for deploying SWIPT systems over wide
areas and especially in applications like IoT. To improve
the efficiency of energy transfer in SWIPT systems, various
techniques can be adopted. In [22], [23], the authors propose
methods based on using relay techniques to achieve this goal.
Another solution for improving the efficiency of energy trans-
fer is using massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO).
By employing a large number of antennas, massive MIMO
can provide extremely narrow beams towards desired users
to efficiently transfer energy to them. Even though massive
MIMO can play a significant role in SWIPT systems, the
research in this area is in its infancy. SWIPT enabled massive
MIMO systems have been investigated in [12], [15], [16],
[24]. In [12], a hybrid time switching and power splitting
SWIPT protocol design in a full-duplex massive MIMO sys-
tem was proposed and the achievable rate was maximized by
optimizing transmit powers of the base station (BS). SWIPT
for the downlink of a multiuser massive MIMO system was
studied in [16] and its achievable rates were computed. In
[15], a massive MIMO SWIPT system assuming Rician fad-
ing channels was investigated and the approximate achievable
rate and harvested energy were derived. In [24], SWIPT in a
3D massive MIMO system was studied and the BS antenna’s
tilt was optimized jointly with power allocation and power
splitting ratios to increase SWIPT efficiency.
Due to the broadcast nature of the wireless channels,
wireless networks are always vulnerable to physical layer
attacks including eavesdropping and jamming. This problem
is more challenging in SWIPT systems since the transmit-
ted energy can help the attackers. Traditionally, communica-
tion security relies on cryptography techniques. Encryption
and decryption algorithms are usually complex and energy-
consuming. Therefore, these techniques are not suitable to
provide security for use in energy-limited networks and
SWIPT systems. Physical layer security has recently received
significant research interests to guarantee secure communi-
cation in SWIPT systems by utilizing physical properties of
wireless channels such as channel fading, noise and interfer-
ence [25]–[29]. In [25], a secure transmission scheme was
proposed by exploiting artificial noise. The authors in [26]
exploit the energy signal in addition to artificial noise to
confound eavesdropper and provide secure communication.
In [27]–[30], security of communication in SWIPT systems
was provided by exploiting optimal beamforming design.
Recently massive MIMO has attracted attention to ensure the
security of transmission. Due to the high spatial resolution
provided in massive MIMO, information leakage to illegal
receivers can be reduced [31]–[35]. However, a so called
pilot contamination attack in the training phase can help an
active eavesdropper to wiretap the signals in massive MIMO
systems [35], [36] In SWIPT systems, massive MIMO can
combat eavesdropping in addition to improve energy and
information transfer efficiency. Despite these advantages,
research on this topic has received scant attention and more
research is necessary. In [9], a SWIPT system with massive
MIMO and separate energy and information receivers was
considered. The effect of phase noise on the accuracy of
channel state information estimation and information leak-
age to energy receivers that are potential eavesdroppers was
studied in [9]. In [37], a multi-cell massive MIMO system
in the presence of a two-antenna active energy harvester was
studied. The energy harvester legitimately harvests energy via
one antenna and illegitimately eavesdrops the signal transmit-
ted for information users via the other antenna. The power
allocation for downlink transmission is optimized according
to the asymptotic lower bound on averaged harvested energy
and ergodic secrecy rate.
Motivated by the above works, in this article, we study
secure transmission in the downlink of a multiuser massive
MIMOSWIPT system. ABS is equipped with a large number
of antennas and simultaneously transmits energy and data
signals to its intended users. Also, an active eavesdropper
in the area wiretaps the signals transmitted by the BS. Each
transmission phase is composed of an uplink training (pilot
transmission) phase and a downlink energy and data signals
transmission phase. In the uplink training phase, the users
send their allocated pilots to the BS and the BS uses them to
estimate the users’ channels. We assume the system operates
in the time division duplex (TDD) mode and because of the
channel reciprocity property, the estimated uplink channels
are then used by the BS for downlink beamforming design.
To facilitate eavesdropping, the eavesdropper contaminates
the uplink training phase and sends a pilot signal to the BS
simultaneously with the users. In this network, both users
and the active eavesdropper employ the hybrid receivers and
decode information and harvest energy by using a power
splitting method. In the above network, we analyze the
achievable secrecy rate and derive an accurate closed-form
lower bound for it. Then, using the derived lower bound, the
achievable secrecy rate is maximized by proper choice of the
power splitting ratio and the fraction of the harvested energy
allocated to the uplink pilot training. In the resulting opti-
mization problem, we consider constraints on the minimum
harvested energy by the user and the maximum harvested
energy by the eavesdropper. Numerical results show that
using massive MIMO can significantly enhance the security
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FIGURE 1. System model of a SWIPT system consisting of a BS equipped
with M antennas, K single antenna users and a single antenna active
eavesdropper. The BS has a continuous and stable power supply, while all
the users and the eavesdropper operate with the wireless EH.
performance of the SWIPT networks. We also show that the
derived lower bound is very close to the actual achievable
secrecy rate.
Notation: Boldface lowercase and uppercase letters denote
vectors and matrices, respectively. The superscript (.), (.)T
and (.)H represent conjugate, transpose, and conjugate trans-
pose, respectively. (.)re and (.)im denote real part and imag-
inary part respectively. The notations |.| and ‖.‖ represent
absolute value and 2-norm. E{.} and var(.) stand for expecta-
tion and variance operations. CN (µ, σ 2) denotes the circular
symmetric complex Gaussian distribution with mean µ and
covariance σ 2. The notation [x]+ denotes max(x, 0).
II. SYSTEM MODEL
AmassiveMIMO system consisting of a BS equipped withM
antennas, K single antenna users, and an active eavesdropper
as shown in Fig. 1 is considered. The BS transmits data to the
users who are able to simultaneously decode the information
and harvest energy from the radio signals. Also, the eaves-
dropper illegally receives the transmitted signal and decodes
the information and harvests energy. It is assumed that the BS,
users and eavesdropper are synchronized and operate using
the TDD protocol. A frame-based transmission in one coher-
ence interval T consisting of two phases is considered. In the
first phase with length τ (i.e. the training phase), the users
simultaneously transmit orthogonal pilots to the BS. Also,
the eavesdropper which aims to receive users’information
illegally, simultaneously transmits a pilot sequence to disturb
the channel estimation. Since the eavesdropper does not know
the users’ pilot sequence, it chooses a random pilot sequence
uniformly distributed over the unit sphere [35].
After receiving the signals in this phase by the BS, uplink
channels are estimated by the BS. The BS then determines
the downlink channel by assuming channel reciprocity. In the
next phase, which is dedicated to data and energy trans-
mission, the BS transmits information and energy signals
to the users using maximal ratio transmission (MRT), and
users harvest the RF energy from the BS and simultaneously
decode information based on the following power-splitting
technique. In the assumed power splitting technique, the
received signal is split into two power streams with power
splitting ratio 1 − ρk and ρk for harvesting energy and
decoding information, respectively (0 < ρk < 1). The
hybrid receiver is a generalization of a conventional informa-
tion receiver and an energy harvesting receiver. In particular,
by setting the power splitting ratios as ρk = 1 and ρk = 0,
the hybrid receiver reduces to an information receiver and an
energy harvesting receiver, respectively.
Let gk =
√
βkhk denote the channel vector between
the BS and the kth user, where βk and hk ∼ CN (0, IM )
represent the large scale fading and small scale fading of
the channel, respectively. Furthermore, gw =
√
βwhw is the
channel vector between eavesdropper and BS where βw and
hw ∼ CN (0, IM ) are the large scale fading and small scale
fading of the channel, respectively.
The channel between all users and the BS can be repre-




where H = [h1, . . . ,hk , . . . ,hK ] and D is a diagonal matrix
whose elements [D]kk = βk .
A. TRAINING PHASE
The pilot sequences used by the users can be represented by
an η×K matrix
√
ηpt8, whereφk , the kth user pilot sequence
is the kth column of8, η represents the pilot sequence length







w + N, (2)
where φw is active the eavesdropper’s pilot sequence and N
is anM × η noise matrix with i.i.d CN (0, σ 2) elements. The
energy allocated to each pilot symbol by the users and eaves-












Eve are total harvested energy by the kth user
and the eavesdropper, respectively. The parameters θ ∈ [0, 1]
and ζ ∈ [0, 1] denote the fraction of total harvested energy
allocated to the pilot phase by the users and the eavesdropper,
respectively.
The minimum mean squared error (MMSE) estimate of G

















σ 2 + qtβw + ηptβk
(6)
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σ 2ek =
(
σ 2 + qtβw
)
βk
σ 2 + qtβw + ηptβk
, (7)
where σ 2ĝk and σ
2
ek are the variances of the independent zero
mean elements in the kth column of Ĝ and E , respectively.
B. DATA AND ENERGY TRANSMISSION PHASE
In this phase, BS transmits information and energy signals
to all users using MRT precoding which is optimal precod-
ing in the massive MIMO regime [39]. The energy signal
is a pseudorandom signal which is perfectly known at the
transmitter and the users. It does not carry any information
and it is transmitted by the BS not only to harvest more
energy by the users but also to confound the eavesdropper.
An eavesdropper that interfered in the training phase and
succeeded in redirecting the signal beam toward itself, can
harvest energy and decode information illegally in this phase.


















where sk ∈ C and wEk ∈ C denote the information and
energy symbols for the kth user. Without loss of general-
ity, it is assumed that E{‖sk‖2} = 1 and E{sk} = 0.




represents the MRT precoding vector of
the kth user. Also, nant,k ∼ CN (0, σ 2ant ) and nant,Eve ∼
CN (0, σ 2ant ) denote additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
at each receiver and eavesdropper, respectively.
III. HARVESTED ENERGY AND ACHIEVABLE SECRECY
RATE
In this section, the harvested energy and achievable secrecy
rate are analyzed, and a lower bound on the achievable
secrecy rate is derived. Achievable secrecy rate is a common
metric to assess the security of transmission and defined
as the rate difference between the main channel from the
BS to the user and the wiretap channel from the BS to the
eavesdropper.
A. AVERAGE HARVESTED ENERGY
The received signal is split into two power streams with
power splitting ratios ρk and 1 − ρk to respectively decode
information and harvest energy by the k’th user [16]. Also,
the received signal is split into two power streams with power
splitting ratios ρEve and 1 − ρEve by the eavesdropper. The
harvested energy by receivers in SWIPT systems is modeled
either as ideal linear [15], [16] or more realistically using
non-linear models [18], [19]. In the non-linear model, the
sensitivity of the energy harvester is limited [20]. Thus, the
harvested energy is modeled using the logistic (or sigmoid)























) − 1] (T − τ )
(11)
where Psk and PsEve denotes the maximum amount of har-
vested power when the EH circuit is saturated at the users
and eavesdropper, respectively. Here, a and b are positive
constants related to the circuit specification. PSEN denotes
the EH sensitivity, that is, the harvester can only collect the
RF energy when the input power is greater than PSEN . It is
assumed that all the users and eavesdropper applies the same
non-linear energy harvester. The harvested energy is used for
information decoding and pilot transmission in the next frame
by the users and the eavesdropper. The PEHk and P
EH
Eve which
are respectively the total harvested power at the k’th user and
eavesdropper can be expressed as



























Theorem 1: By exploiting MRT precoding, the total
received RF power by the k’th user and eavesdropper can be
respectively obtained as
















σ 2 + qtβw + ηptβi
)
(WE + 1)+ σ 2ant
)
. (15)
Proof: Based on (12) and (13), the total received RF
power by the users and the eavesdropper can be expanded
respectively as
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B. ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE
After power splitting, the k’th user and eavesdropper signal
for information decoding can be respectively rewritten as
ykID =
√






















































wiwEi + nant,Eve)+ ns,
(19)
where ns is additional processing noise modeled as ns ∈
CN (0, σ 2s ).






where Rk and REve are the user and eavesdropper achievable
rate, respectively.
Theorem 2: By exploiting MRT precoding and MMSE
channel estimation, the kth user achievable secrecy rate lower
bound can be represented as (21), as shown at the bottom of
the page.
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix A.
IV. ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS
To obtain an analytical insight, a massive MIMO system in
which the number of antennas grows sufficiently large is
considered.
The asymptotic total RF power received at the k’th user
and the eavesdropper can be expressed as
Pasymk = (1− ρk )
Mηptβ2k(
ηptβk + qtβw + σ 2
) (WE + 1) , (22)




ηptβk + qtβw + σ 2
) (WE + 1) .
(23)
As it can be seen, the total RF power received at the user and
eavesdropper increase by the number of antennas. Also, the









−a([Pasymk − PSEN ]
+ − b)
) − 1]









−a([PasymEve − PSEN ]
+ − b)
) − 1]
× (T − τ ), (25)
It is also seen that the non-linear harvested energy increases
by the number of antennas since it is a monotonically increas-
ing function of the total received RF power [20]. Due to hard-
ware limitations, the non-linear harvested energy saturates to
Psk for an extremely large number of antennas.
When the number of antennas grows sufficiently large,
the asymptotic secrecy rate increases with the number of
antennas and the effect of the eavesdropper can be neglected
as given in (26), as shown at the bottom of the next page.
V. ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE MAXIMIZATION
Since the achievable secrecy rate is a criterion to assess com-











Kβk + (k − 1)βkWE +
βk (qtβw + σ 2)
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in this section. The maximization is done subject to the
required user harvested energy that guarantees the user’s
proper operation (Qmin) and a constraint on eavesdropper’s
harvested energy for limiting its operation (Qmax). The opti-
mization parameters are power splitting ratio (ρk ) and har-
vested energy allocation factor (θ). Considering the above




s.t. QNLk ≥ Qmin (27b)
QNLEve ≤ Qmax (27c)
0 ≤ ρk ≤ 1 (27d)
0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. (27e)
Since computation of exact achievable secrecy rate in (27a)
is complex, its lower bound in the previous section can
replace the objective function. Also (27c) can be replaced
with θ > θmin, since θ is in the denominator in (15) and the
eavesdropper’s harvested energy is strictly decreasing with θ .
Due to the (1− ρk ) coefficient in (14), user harvested energy
is strictly decreasing with ρk . According to that and since
θ > θmin, (27b) can be replaced with ρk < ρkmax . Hence,




s.t. 0 ≤ ρk ≤ ρkmax (28b)
θmin ≤ θ ≤ 1. (28c)
In the feasible set of this problem, the objective function is
strictly increasing with respect to the two parameters θ and ρk
(see appendix C). Hence, we conclude that the optimal value
is a point on the border of the feasible set [41]. In other words,
to maximize the lower bound of the secrecy rate, it is enough
to set both the parameters of θ and ρk to their maximum, i.e.,
θ = 1 and ρk = ρkmax .
The harvested energy by the users is used for uplink pilot
training and data processing. Since the power consumption
of data processing is relatively small, it can be neglected
and we can assume θ = 1 [15], [42], [43]. Accordingly,
the optimal secrecy rate lower bound can be represented
as (29), as shown at the bottom of the next page.
TABLE 1. Simulation parameters.
FIGURE 2. Average user’s harvested energy versus the number of
antennas at the BS, where ρk = [0.1,0.5,0.8] and θ = 0.7.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A single cell SWIPT enabled massive MIMO system with
four users and one active eavesdropper is simulated. The
large scale fading are modeled as βk = 10−3d
−3
k and βw =
10−3d−3w for the users and eavesdropper, respectively [16],
where dk ∼ U[10, 20] (meters) and dw ∼ U[10, 20] (meters)
denote the kth user’s and eavesdropper’s distance from the





1+M ρkηptβ2k /(σ 2 + qtβw + ηptβk )
ρk
(
Kβk + (k − 1)βkWE +
βk (qtβw + σ 2)












ηptβi + qtβw + σ 2
(WE + 1)−
qtβ2w
σ 2 + qtβw + ηptβk
) (
ηptβk + qtβw + σ 2
)
 (26)
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FIGURE 3. Average user’s harvested energy versus the fraction of energy
allocated to pilot training by the user. The users and eavesdropper
distance from the BS are dk = [11,13,16,18], dw = 15, respectively and
ρk = 0.4.
Fig. 2 shows the average user’s harvested energy versus
the number of antennas at the BS for ρk = [0.1, 0.5, 0.8].
It can be seen that simulated and theoretical results for the
user’s harvested energy are very close to each other. Also, the
results indicate the accuracy of the asymptotic expression for
the user’s harvested energy. It is observed that the amount
of harvested energy increases linearly with the number of
antennas and decreases with the user power splitting ratio.
Fig. 3 illustrates the average user’s harvested energy ver-
sus the fraction of energy allocated to pilot training by the
user. This figure shows that the amount of harvested energy
increases by the fraction of energy allocated to the pilot
training. In fact, the channel estimation accuracy is improved
by increasing the allocated energy to pilot training, and the
BS provides more concentrated beams towards the users.
Thus energy is transferred more efficiently and the amount
of harvested energy by the user is increased. The figure
FIGURE 4. User’s achievable secrecy rate versus the fraction of energy
allocated to pilot training by the user. The users and eavesdropper
distance from the BS are dk = [11,13,16,18], dw = 15, respectively and
ρk = 0.4.
also shows a good agreement between the theoretical and
simulated results.
Fig. 4 shows the user’s achievable secrecy rate versus the
fraction of energy allocated to pilot training by the user. It can
be observed that the achievable secrecy rate increases with
the allocated energy to pilot training, due to more accurately
beamformed information signals to the users. Furthermore,
the simulated achievable secrecy rate and the obtained lower
bound are close to each other.
Fig. 5 shows the active and passive eavesdropper’s achiev-
able rates versus the fraction of energy allocated to the
users’ uplink pilot training. Here by passive eavesdropper,
we mean an eavesdropper who does not transmit any signals
and only harvests energy and decodes the information at
the downlink. This figure shows a comparison between the
two cases of active and passive eavesdropper and the effect
of massive MIMO in these two cases. As can be observed,
















Kβk + (k − 1)βkWE +
βk (qtβw + σ 2)
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FIGURE 5. Average achievable rate at the eavesdropper versus the
fraction of energy allocated to pilot training by the user. The users, active
eavesdropper and passive eavesdropper distance from the BS are
dk = [11,13,16,18], dw = 15 and dpassive = 15, respectively and
ρk = 0.4.
FIGURE 6. Average achievable secrecy rate versus the fraction of energy
allocated to pilot training by the user. The user and active eavesdropper
distances from the BS are dk = 13 and dw = 15, respectively. User power
splitting ratio and eavesdropper power splitting ratio are set ρk = 0.4 and
ζ = [0.2 0.5 0.7] for the number of antennas at BS
M = [200 400 800].
eavesdropper, channel estimation and beamforming are more
accurate. Thus, the eavesdropper’s achievable rate decreases
by increasing the energy allocated to pilot training. For users
where the active eavesdropper is located closer to the BS, the
eavesdropper’s achievable rate first increases due to stronger
pilot training by the eavesdropper and then decreases due to
increasing the power of user pilot training. Also, it can be seen
that the passive eavesdropper’s achievable rate is extremely
low, and increasing θ does not affect it. This is due to that the
passive eavesdropper does not attend in the pilot training.
Fig. 6 indicates that the eavesdropper can improve its rate
and reduce the secrecy rate by allocating more power to its
pilot phase. Also, it can be seen that by increasing the number
FIGURE 7. Achievable Rates versus the number of antennas at the BS. The
user and eavesdropper distances from the BS are dk = 13 and dw = 15.
ρk = 0.4 and θ = 0.7.
of antennas at the BS (i.e. enabling narrower beams toward
the users), allocating more power to the pilot phase by the
eavesdropper will not improve its rate and the secrecy rate
does not change anymore.
Fig. 7 shows the achievable rates versus the number of
antennas at the BS. It can be seen that in a small number
of antennas ( i.e. when M is small which is related to the
conventional MIMO), the user’s and eavesdropper’s achiev-
able rate increase by the number of antennas. However, when
the number of antennas grows very large ( i.e. when M is
large which is related to the Massive MIMO), the eavesdrop-
per rate is limited to a constant value while the user’s rate
still increases with the number of antennas. In other words,
this figure shows a comparison between the results of the
proposed scheme in two cases of conventional MIMO and
massive MIMO systems.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this article, a secure SWIPT system exploiting power split-
ting in the downlink of a multiuser massive MIMO system
with uplink pilot training was investigated. To assess the
security of communication a lower bound for the achiev-
able secrecy rate was derived. Based on the derived lower
bound, the power splitting ratio and the fraction of harvested
energy allocated to uplink pilot training were obtained in
order to maximize the achievable secrecy rate subject to the
minimum harvested energy required for the user and the
maximum harvested energy for the eavesdropper to restrict its
performance. The numerical results verify the accuracy of the
obtained secrecy rate lower bound. It is revealed that massive
MIMO noticeably can improve communication security by
transmitting data towards users via narrow beams.
In this article, it is assumed that the active eavesdropper
channel and the users’ channels are independent. Assum-
ing various degrees of correlations between the channels of
eavesdropper and the users, it is interesting to investigate how
VOLUME 8, 2020 150521
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this correlation could affect the eavesdropping and if massive
MIMO can prevent information leakage also in this case.
It seems likely that correlation between the channels of the
eavesdropper and the users would help the eavesdropper to
more easily eavesdrop information and harvest more energy,
since redirecting the signal beam toward itself might be easier
in this case.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1




= E{max((Rk − Reaves, 0)}
b
≥ max (E {Rk − REve} , 0)
c
≥ E {Rk − REve} , (30)
where in (a) the achievable secrecy rate is written in another
form, (b) is because of Jensen’s inequality and (c) is because
the maximum of two values is greater than or equal to each
of them.




























M (ηptβk + qtβw + σ 2)
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(31)
Although the user knows the energy signal which is trans-
mitted by the BS, it can not remove it completely from the
received signal due to imperfect channel state information
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Also an upper bound for (32) can be obtained according to


































and µ ∈ [1,∞]. By assuming µ = 1,
the maximum value of C is C = 3/8. Also σ 2Z is defined as























Some useful equations for calculating σ 2Z are provided in
appendix B.
By substituting the result of expectation from appendix B,
σ 2Z in (36) is obtained as
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By substituting obtained bounds, (34) and (38)
into (30), the achievable secrecy rate lower bound can be
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FIGURE 8. Positivity of secrecy rate lower bound. The secrecy rate lower
bound versus harvested energy allocation factor is plotted for various
locations of the users and the active eavesdropper. dk ∼ U [10,20]































Since the achievable secrecy rate is positive, the positiv-
ity of the obtained lower bound is substantial for replacing
the achievable secrecy rate with its lower bound in (27a).
Lower bound positivity or negativity is not obvious and also
determining its positivity or negativity is not simple. Fig. 8
shows the secrecy rate lower bound for various locations of
the users and the eavesdropper. It is almost always positive
unless the eavesdropper is located near the BS and the other
users are close to the desired user and interference is strong.
The secrecy rate lower bound is negative when θ < 0.05. The
negativity of the lower bound can be ignored due to its scarce
occurrence and almost always θ > 0.05.
APPENDIX B
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(47)
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∣∣gHw gw∣∣3} are respectively third and fourth moment
of a Chi-Square distribution. The Chi-square distribution
moments with k degree of freedom are given by
E{Xm} = k(k + 2) . . . (k + 2m− 2),
where k is the vector length. Since the eavesdropper channel
vector is complex and the above equation is for a real vec-
tor, the degree of freedom for the eavesdropper channel is







































By substituting (47), (48) and (49) into (40) the first term
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The partial derivatives of the secrecy rate lower bound accord-
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FIGURE 9. Positivity of derivative function of the secrecy rate lower
bound according to harvested energy allocation factor (θ). The derivative
function of secrecy rate lower bound is plotted for various locations of
the users and the active eavesdropper. dk ∼ U [10,20] (meters) and
dw ∼ U [10,20] (meters).
at the bottom of the page. As it can be seen in (51), the
partial derivative according to ρk is always positive and non-
zero. Thus the secrecy rate lower bound is strictly increasing
with ρk .
Determining the positivity of the partial derivative func-
tion according to θ is not straightforward. Fig. 9 shows the
positivity of the partial derivative function according to θ for
various distances of the users and eavesdropper from the BS.
As it can be seen, the partial derivative function is positive and
non-zero. Therefore, the secrecy rate lower bound is strictly
increasing with θk .
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